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In this paper, we empirically investigate whether and to what extent
major changes in IPR contributed to subsequent upgrading of innovative
capabilities and patenting in Korea. We found that major IPR changes in
Korea in the 1980s led to the big increase in patenting, thereby
supporting the “friendly court” hypothesis. Especially, the trend of
substance patent applications by local residents seems to suggest that
the IPR change in Korea encouraged local firms to focus more on
developing innovative capabilities and patenting more actively. Based on
the Korean experience, we offer an insight into the recent debate on the
relationship between IPR and economic development in developing
countries. 
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INTRODUCTION
South Korea has achieved one of the highest GDP growth rate
since Korea embarked on its first five-year economic development
plan in 1962. What is more amazing in Korea’s ascent in the
world economy is the recent surge in Korean patents (Song,
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2002). The following statistics illustrate how quickly and
drastically Korea has recently increased its patents. 
- In terms of the number of patents registered in the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), Korea had only 2 patents in
1980. However, the total number of Korean patents registered in
the U.S. in 2004 has increased to 4428. As shown in figure 1,
the growth in Korean patents registered in the U.S. has
accelerated over time, especially in the late 1990s. In 1995,
Korea was ranked as # 21. But, in 1999, Korea emerged as # 6 in
the U.S. patent ranking. In the 1990s, Korean patent
registrations in the U.S. have increased by 36% annually, while
the average growth rates for OECD countries and all the
countries were 5.8% and 6.1% in the same period respectively
(OECD, 2000). 
- Samsung Electronics in Korea became the fourth largest
patent registrant in the U.S. in 1999 — 5th in 2005 — just
behind IBM (U.S.), NEC (Japan), and Canon (Japan) by
registering 1545 patents. Samsung Electronics entered the top
100 patent registrant list in 1991 for the first time. The company
rose to # 16 in 1997 and moved up to # 4 in just 2 years by
almost tripling its patents registered in the U.S. 
- In terms of international patent applications through the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), Korea emerged as # 7 in 2004
by filing 3565 international patents.
How could Koreans achieve such a remarkable success in
increasing the number of patents dramatically? What factors can
explain the Korean success in improving innovative capabilities
that led to the upsurge in Korean patents in the 1990s? This
paper would attempt to seek an answer to these questions by
focusing on how changes in intellectual property regime (IPR) in
Korea influenced innovative capabilities and patenting of Korea. 
By examining the relationship between IPR changes and
patenting as an outcome of innovative capabilities in the context
of Korea, this study intends to offer an insight into a recent
debate on the impact of stronger IPR on the development of
innovative capabilities of developing countries (Maskus, 2000a).
Since 1980, Korea has changed its IPRs to upgrade itself from
imitator to innovator. Korea’s IPR focused on both technology
creation and diffusion that are worth studying and showcasing
for other developing countries that are faced with having to
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upgrade their regimes under the WTO mandate. In this paper,
using our proprietary patent database, we investigate the impact
of major changes in Korean IPRs on the upsurge in Korean
patenting both at home and in the United States. 
IPR, INNOVATIVE CAPABILITIES, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Recently, there have been heated debates on the impact of
stronger IPR on economic development of developing countries
(Maskus, 2000a). Generally, the objectives of the IPR can be
divided into two categories: pro-creation and pro-diffusion. The
pro-diffusion view emphasizes the role of IPR in diffusing existing
technologies throughout the society either in the form of
technology licensing or imitation. On the other hand, the pro-
creation view focuses on the positive effect of IPR on the
promotion of innovation. Unlike developed countries where the
pro-creation role of IPR has been very effective and thus,
dominant, developing countries with weak innovative capabilities
often preferred the pro-diffusion role of the IPR. In this section,
based on existing studies, we briefly describe relationships
among IPR, innovative activities, and economic development with
a special emphasis on the debate between the pro-creation view
and the pro-diffusion view. 
Pro-creation and pro-diffusion views of IPR
Governments often strengthen IPR in the hope of promoting
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investments in knowledge creation and business innovation by
establishing exclusive rights to use and sell newly developed
technologies (Maskus, 2000b). IPR could help reward creativity
and risk-taking among local firms and entrepreneurs, thereby
promoting technical progress and economic development.
Governments also aim at promoting widespread dissemination of
new knowledge by encouraging intellectual property rights
holders to place their inventions and ideas on the market.
Moreover, by strengthening IPR, governments also hope to
attract foreign investments and advanced technologies. Foreign
technology holders often refuse to license their latest innovations
to firms in countries with weak IPR because they fear that the
licensing contracts will eventually be unenforceable (Sherwood,
1990). Thus, local firms often find that weak IPR at home
impedes their efforts to purchase technologies from abroad
(Gould and Gruben, 1996). Mansfield (1994) suggested that a
country’s weak IPR indeed can deter foreign direct investments,
especially those of R&D facilities. 
Following the tradition of Schumpeter (1942), Romer (1991)
argued that stronger protection of patents as the outcome of
R&D investments should encourage innovation and economic
development. Gould and Gruben (1996) showed that intellectual
property protection is a significant determinant of economic
growth by stimulating innovation. Maskus (2000b) also argued
that inadequate IPR could stifle innovation and technical change
even in under-developed countries because innovation in these
poor countries are aimed at local markets and could benefit from
domestic protection of patents. Park and Ginarte (1997) also
argued that IPR affects economic growth indirectly by stimulating
the accumulation of factor inputs like R&D and physical capital. 
However, Park and Ginarte also found that IPR explains only
the physical and research capital investment behavior of the top
30 advanced economies. Similarly, Helpman (1993) argued that
developing countries could suffer from stronger IPRs because of
higher imitation costs and the consequent reduction in
technology availability. In support of the pro-diffusion
perspective, he suggested that strengthening IPR in developing
countries has a negative effect on the rate of innovation when
imitation is the only channel of international production transfer.
Glass and Saggi (1995) also contended that more protective IPR
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could decrease the flow of technology transferred to developing
countries.
This controversy may indicate that there exist two-way causal
relationships between IPR and economic development. Rising
income levels generate stronger incentives for upgrading IPRs,
which in turn lays a foundation for further growth, especially for
developed countries (Maskus, 2000a). As incomes rise, the
demand for higher quality, differentiated products also rises,
leading the growing preferences for stronger IPRs. On the other
hand, IPR can play a positive role in promoting economic growth
by encouraging new business development, rationalization of
inefficient industry, and inducing technology acquisition and
creation (Maskus, 2000b). For technology importing nations to
benefit from stronger IPRs, there must be dynamic gains that
could emerge over time. Such gains could come from enhanced
flows of international trade, investment, and technology transfer
(Maskus, 2000c). 
Existing studies also indicate that the level of R&D
investments are complementary to IPRs in determining the IPR’s
impact on economic development. Countries that do not conduct
innovative research much would enjoy few, if any, of the benefits
of strong IPR (Park and Ginarte, 1997). Countries without a
strong domestic research base may find it difficult to justify
providing IPR protection to foreigners, who seem to be the
primary beneficiaries of protection, if in the short run, the
consequences of IPR protection are higher prices of new
technologies and limited diffusion. Park and Ginarte (1997)
found that while R&D is an important determinant of economic
growth for both developed and developing countries, IPRs matter
for the R&D activities of the developed economies, but not for
those of the less developed economies. In a sense, there may be
two-way causal relationship between strong IPR and strong
innovative R&D, mutually reinforcing each other. Similarly,
countries that nurtured high-quality R&D researchers and
engineers would have better ability to adapt imported
technologies to local industrial uses and further develop new
technologies and products, thereby generating stronger benefits
from the IPR infrastructure.
Without such complementary investments in domestic R&D
bases and human capital, developing a strong IPR in the context
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of developing countries may be sometimes more harmful than
beneficial, as Helpman (1993) and Glass and Saggi (1995)
argued. This is because providing strong IPR is costly, especially
for developing countries. Without strong enforcement of
intellectual property protection, local firms in developing
countries may be able to reverse engineer or imitate newly
invented goods or processes and sell them to consumers at
cheaper prices (Maskus, 2000a). Moreover, setting up and
maintaining patent offices and courts is also costly (Siebeck,
1990). Accordingly, a country needs for a critical size of R&D
investments to justify such costs. 
In the subsequent section, we investigate the relationship
among IPR changes, R&D investments, and patenting in the
context of Korea. Especially, we examine to what extent major
changes in IPR contributed to the upsurge in Korean patenting
in the 1990s as an outcome of enhanced innovative capabilities.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Korea has been viewed as a model country of building
innovative capabilities successfully in the economic development
process. Thus, examining the relationships among IPR changes,
R&D investments to build innovative capabilities, and patenting
as an outcome measure of innovative capabilities in Korea may
offer an interesting insight into the ongoing debate on the role of
strong IPRs in promoting innovative capabilities and patenting as
a basis of economic development. 
Strong IPR in Korea
To investigate the role of IPR changes empirically, the most
fundamental task is to measure the relative strength of IPRs on a
consistent international basis. Recently, some scholars
attempted to develop such a consistent international index of
IPRs for cross-country comparisons, most notably the index
developed by Ginarte and Park (1997). We use this index
developed by Ginarte and Park — what we call the GP Index —
for our empirical investigation of Korean IPR changes. 
According to the GP Index, as shown in table 1, Korea rapidly
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increased the strength of its IPR in the 1980s for the protection
of intellectual property rights of innovators. Even in the 1970s,
Korea’s GP Index was higher than the average. In 1970, Korea’s
GP Index value was 2.94, while the global average in the GP
Index was 2.27. In the 1980s, Korea’s GP Index jumped from
3.28 in 1980 to 3.94 in 1990. In 1990, the worldwide average for
the GP Index was merely 2.46, a slight increase from 2.27 in
1970. The trend of the Korean GP Index confirms that major
changes in IPR indeed occurred in the 1980s. 
More importantly, the GP Index of Korea clearly shows that
Korea introduced much stronger IPRs early on than other major
developing countries such as Brazil, India, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. In 1990, for example, Korea’s GP Index was 3.94,
whereas the values for Brazil, India, Hong Kong, and Singapore
were only 1.85, 1.62, 2.57, and 2.57 respectively. These figures
clearly show the pro-creation focus of the Korean IPR.
Furthermore, Korea’s GP Index even surpassed those of many
developed countries by 1990. In 1990, France and Germany
received lower GP Index values than Korea. Japan was tied to
Korea in terms of the GP Index.
To examine whether Korea’s IPR was much stronger than
predicted by per capita GDP, we ran a simple regression using a
sample of 48 countries. As shown in figure 2, in a regression of
the GP Index as of 1990 on per capita GDP for the same year,
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Table 1. Index of IPR (GP Index)
Country 1970 1980 1985 1990
Brazil 1.64 1.85 1.85 1.85
France 3.24 3.90 3.90 3.90
Germany 3.09 3.86 3.71 3.71
Hong Kong 2.04 2.24 2.57 2.57
India 1.42 1.62 1.62 1.48
Japan 3.32 3.94 3.94 3.94
Korea 2.94 3.28 3.61 3.94
Singapore 2.37 2.57 2.57 2.57
U.S.A. 3.86 4.19 4.52 4.52
Average 2.27 2.40 2.44 2.46
Maximum 3.86 4.24 4.52 4.52
Source: Ginarte and Park, 1997: 285-286.
Korea’s GP Index was out of the upper limit of the 95%
confidence level of the regression, confirming statistically that
Korea adopted a much stronger IPR than warranted by per capita
GDP. 
Upsurge of Korean Patenting and the Friendly Court Hypothesis 
We further investigate whether and to what extent major
changes in IPR contributed to the rapid development of Korea’s
innovative capabilities and upsurge of patenting as a
consequence. Kortum and Lerner (1999) empirically examined
the conventional view (e.g., Merges, 1992) that the establishment
of the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit by Congress in
1982 triggered the subsequent surge in U.S. patenting since the
1980s. They called this view a “friendly court hypothesis.” In the
empirical examination of the recent surge in Korean patenting,
we test the friendly court hypothesis that emphasizes the positive
effects of stronger intellectual property protection by law and
court orders on motivations to innovate and patent. 
Kortum and Lerner (1999) tested the friendly court hypothesis
by examining the changes in the number of patents in the U.S.
as a patenting destination. Kortum and Lerner assumed that if
the friendly court hypothesis is right, then both U.S. and foreign
firms should find patenting in the U.S. increasingly attractive
and thus, increase in patenting should be relatively uniform
across the types of patentees — domestic residents or foreign
residents. In their empirical examination, the friendly court
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Figure 2. Simple Regression of IPR on GDP
hypothesis was not accepted because foreign patent applications
in the United States did not increase as much as domestic
residents’ applications after the major IPR change in the early
1980s. 
Using the Korean patent data, we did the similar test to
examine how important major IPR changes in Korea were in the
dramatic increase in Korean patenting. The first task for this
investigation was to identify major IPR changes in Korea. To do
so, we conducted interviews with local experts at KIPO and
patent lawyers. We also reviewed existing studies of IPR changes
in Korea. Based on our interviews and literature review, we
concluded that there were three major changes in Korean IPRs
since the 1970s. The three major changes that we identified are
as follows:
(1) 1980-1982: Revision of the patent law in 1980 in
compliance with the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the subsequent revision of the patent law
in 1982 in compliance with the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
(2) 1986: Revision of the patent law in 1986 to introduce the
substance patent for pharmaceutical and chemical materials
(3) 1995-1997: Revision of the patent law in 1995 in
compliance with Uruguay Round/Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (UR/TRIPs) as well as to reform the
appeals/trials system; Revision of the patent law in 1997 to
introduce opposition to the grant of patents after registration
For our empirical investigation, we focused on the first two
changes because we do not have enough time series to
investigate the effects of the last change that was made in the
late 1990s. If we borrow Kortum and Lerner’s testing method of
the friendly court hypothesis, patent applications by foreign
residents should increase at least as much as those by local
residents. Figure 3 shows the trend of patent applications by
both local and foreign residents. Figure 4 highlights the trend of
foreign patent applications in Korea as opposed to the total
patent applications. Figure 4 shows that foreign patent
applications in Korea had two major inflection points in the
1980s. The first jump in foreign patent applications took place in
1983 just after the major changes in Korean IPRs between 1980
and 1982. Then the second jump in foreign patent applications
occurred around 1986 and 1987 just after the introduction of the
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substance patent in pharmaceutical and chemical areas. We
should also note that in the 1980s when the major IPR changes
were made in Korea, the growth rate of patent applications by
foreigners was higher than that by local residents, although
patent applications by the latter has also increased steadily in
this period. These patterns appear to support the friendly court
view that major IPR changes indeed are important in patenting in
Korea.
To check whether the jump in patent applications by foreigners
was a unique phenomenon in Korea, we compared the trends of
patent applications by Japanese and Germans in Korea with
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those in the U.S. Figures 5 and 6 show the Japanese and
German patent applications in Korea and in the U.S.
respectively. In both figures, we learned that the jump in the
Japanese and German patent applications in Korea around 1986
and 1987 were a largely unique phenomenon. There was a
similar surge in patent applications by Japanese and Germans in
both Korea and the United States around 1982. The surge in the
U.S. appears to reflect major changes in IPRs in the U.S. as well.
In addition, the growth rate of Japanese patent applications in
Korea appears to be higher than that in the United States in the
1980s.
To examine the effect of IPR changes on the increase in patent
applications more formally, we did a series of T-tests (tables 2
and 3). Results from the paired t-tests of patent growth rates of
Japan and Germany in Korea and the U.S. between 1983 and
1991 respectively confirm that the patent growth rate in Korea
was significantly higher than that in the U.S. for both Japanese
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and German patents at the significance level of p = 0.1. 
We further investigated the effects of the introduction of
substance patents in 1986 on the subsequent increase in
patenting in Korea. Table 4 shows the trends of substance patent
applications in Korea after the revision of the patent law in 1986.
Just after the introduction of substance patents, foreign
residents’ applications of substance patents poured in.
Unfortunately, we do not have the annual data on substance
patent counts between 1987 and 1990, but on average,
foreigners filed almost 1500 substance patents annually in 1987-
1990. After a big wave of substance patent applications in the
late 1980s, the annual count of substance patents filed by
foreigners has decreased until 1994 and then rebounded again
only after 1996. We should also note that substance patent
applications by foreigners were more than 15 times as high as
those by local residents in the late 1980s, suggesting that
foreigners were initial beneficiaries of the major IPR change in
Korea. To sum up the analysis above, we can conclude that the
higher growth rate of patent applications by foreigners than that
by local residents just after the major changes in IPRs in Korea
in the 1980s appear to provide a supporting evidence of the
“friendly court” argument. 
However, the impact of these major IPR changes on patent
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Table 2. T-Test of Growth Rate of Japanese Patents in Korea Vs. in
the U.S.
Mean Standard Deviation t-value
Growth rate in Korea Vs. 
.1733 .2350
Growth rate in the U.S. 2.213*
Note: *: p=0.1; **: p=0.05; ***: p=0.01
Table 3. T-Test of Growth Rate of German Patents in Korea Vs. in
the U.S.
Mean Standard Deviation t-value
Growth rate in Korea Vs.
0.076 .1407
Growth rate in the U.S. 1.835*
Note: *: p=0.1; **: p=0.05; ***: p=0.01
applications by local Korean residents is less certain. Given that
we are mainly interested in the upsurge in Korean patenting over
time, what is more relevant to this study is the impacts of major
IPR changes on Korean patenting activities rather than those of
foreigners in Korea. To examine the effects of major IPR changes
on Korean patenting more formally, we ran a simple regression of
U.S. patent counts in 1998 on the IPR index of 1990. We used
the IPR index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and
constructed the country-level data set based on the availability of
the IPR index. To avoid potential simultaneity and reflect the
lagged effects of IPR on building innovative capabilities and then
obtaining patents, we gave an 8-year time lag. The result from a
linear regression in figure 7 shows that Korea’s patent counts in
the U.S. is slightly out of the upper limit of the 95% confidence
level (the upper and the lower dotted lines in the figure) along the
regression line, suggesting that Korea obtained significantly more
patents than the simple regression predicted based on its relative
IPR index.
To obtain a more direct evidence of the positive effect of
stronger IPR on building innovative capabilities of Korean firms,
we further investigated the case of Korean pharmaceutical and
chemical firms. As we mentioned above, just after the
introduction of substance patents, foreign residents applied for
almost 6000 substance patents in just four years (see table 4). In
the late 1980s, substance patent applications by foreigners were
more than 15 times as high as those by local residents,
suggesting that foreigners, mostly American, Japanese, and
European pharmaceutical and chemical firms, were initial
beneficiaries of the major IPR change in Korea.
Not surprisingly, the introduction of substance patents in 1986
hit the Korean chemical and pharmaceutical companies hard
because they used to copy foreign technologies and products.
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Table 4. Trends of Substance Patent Applications in Korea (Counts)
Year 87~90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Local Residents 354 161 178 243 346 311 347 582 547
Foreign Residents 5,950 1,448 1,214 1,078 1,098 1,147 1,084 1,343 1,482
Total 6,304 1,609 1,392 1,321 1,444 1,458 1,431 1,925 2,029
Source: KIPO
Because most of them did not conduct serious innovative R&D
before the introduction of substance patents, in the late 1980s,
the share of domestic applications was far less than 10%. 
However, fierce competition from multinational corporations in
the home turf made these Korean companies shift their focus
rapidly towards more innovative R&D and alliances with
technology holders abroad. Their desperate efforts for innovative
R&D for survival began to pay off in the mid-1990s. As shown in
figure 8, the share of applications by local residents was up to
almost 30%, although the ratio dropped again due to the
financial crisis in 1997. The rapid increase in substance patent
applications by local residents seems to suggest how changes in
IPR can influence the direction and the intensity of R&D by
indigenous firms by imposing more intense competitive
pressures, especially from multinational corporations. 
We found additional evidence of the positive role of IPR
changes in promoting innovation and patenting. Recently, the
Korean government paid attention to the rapidly increasing use
of Internet and the proliferation of electronic commerce-related
start-ups. In order to cope with this new trend, KIPO instituted
the Examination Guideline for E-Commerce Related Inventions
in 2000. Under the new guideline, so-called business model
patents (BM patents) can be patentable. After the institution of
the new guideline, the number of applications for e-commerce
related patents have soared almost 9-fold from 1133 in 1999 to
9895 in 2000, as shown in figure 9. The upsurge of BM patents
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Note: X1 = IPR Index in 1990 (based on Ginarte and Park, 1997); LnY =
natural log of U.S. patent counts in 1998
Figure 7. Relationship Between the IPR Strength and Income Levels
after a related IPR change offers another supporting evidence of
the positive impact of the IPR changes on technical changes and
patenting. 
Finally, we examined whether stronger IPR can also encourage
local companies to spend more money conducting innovative
R&D. The R&D intensity that is defined as the ratio of R&D
expenditures to GDP in Korea rose substantially in the 1990s.
The share of R&D expenditure to GNP in Korea was merely
0.58% in 1980. However, the ratio has risen sharply and by
1990, it reached almost 2%. The trend was accelerated in the
1990s until the economic crisis in 1997 and the ratio was up to
Intellectual Property Regimes, Innovative Capabilities, and Patenting in Korea71
Source: KIPO, 2001
Figure 9. Application Trend of E-Commerce Related Patents
almost 3% in 1997. By the late 1990s, the R&D intensity of
Korea was even higher than that of Germany, U.K., or France. To
examine whether the R&D intensity of Korea is significantly
higher than predicted by the level of IPR, we ran a simple
regression of the R&D intensity in 1992 on the GP Index of IPR
as of 1990. As shown in figure 10, the R&D intensity of Korea is
above the regression line, but within the boundary of the 95%
confidence level.
Pro-diffusion perspective of IPR in Korea
Although the Korean government clearly emphasized the pro-
creation role of the stronger patent protection in its IPR, the
government also believed that stronger patent protection is likely
to lead to more active technology transfer from multinational
corporations with less fear about illegal technological leakages
(interviews at KIPO and Kim & Chang). Figure 11 below shows
how the number of technology licensing from abroad in the
chemical industry has increased over time. Technology licensing
has increased substantially around and after the introduction of
substance patents in 1987 and then decreased sharply in the
1990s. Figure 12 shows that there was a substantial increase in
foreign direct investments in the chemical industry in the late
1980s as well. These figures indicate that in response to the
introduction of substance patents, a substantial number of
multinational chemical companies decided to make technology
licensing or direct investments in Korea. The sharp decrease in
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Figure 10. Simple Regression of the R&D Intensity on IPR
technology licensing from foreign firms in the 1990s may also
offer an indirect evidence of improved technological capabilities
of Korean chemical firms as a result of a sharp increase in R&D
efforts in response to the introduction of substance patents. The
patterns are similar in the pharmaceutical industry.
These data seem to show that the pro-creation role of the IPR
may not be necessarily incompatible with the pro-diffusion role
of the IPR. As shown in the Korean pharmaceutical and chemical
industry cases after the introduction of the substance patents,
the government policy to strengthen the stronger intellectual
property protection appear to induce more technology licensing
as well as promote more investments of domestic firms in R&D
and innovation. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we empirically investigated to what extent major
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changes in IPR influenced subsequent upgrading of innovative
capabilities and patenting in Korea. To sum up our findings,
since 1980, Korea has made major changes in IPR. Initially,
major IPR changes in Korea were triggered by the pressure from
the U.S. government, but the Korean government also attempted
to push local companies to transform themselves from imitators
to innovators by strengthening IPR. As a result, in 1990, Korea’s
IPR index was much higher than the global average and even
higher than those of France and Germany. 
We found that major IPR changes in the 1980s led to the big
increase in patenting, thereby supporting the “friendly court”
hypothesis. Especially, the trend of substance patent
applications by local residents seems to suggest that the IPR
change indeed encouraged local firms to focus more on
developing innovative capabilities and patenting more actively. 
The Korean experience appears to offer an important insight
into the recent debate on the relationship between IPR and
economic development in developing countries. Major changes in
the Korean IPR appear to have influenced the shift of private
corporations’ strategic focus towards more R&D and innovation-
driven growth strategy under the more intense competition from
foreign multinationals, thereby promoting economic
development. In this respect, the Korean IPR, especially the legal
framework, is mainly pro-creation-oriented. However, we should
note that as evidenced by the introduction of substance patents,
the stronger protection of the intellectual property rights also
motivated foreign firms to license their technologies more actively
to Korean firms, thereby promoting the diffusion of patented
technologies. In conclusion, IPR changes in Korea seem to have
contributed positively to the upgrading of innovative capabilities
and the upsurge of patenting. 
REFERENCES
Ginarte, J. and W. Park (1997), “Determinants of Patent Rights: A
Cross-National Study,” Research Policy, 26, 283-301.
Glass, A. and K. Saggi (1995), Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct
Investment, and Innovation. Ohio State University. 
Gould, D. and W. Gruben (1996), “The Role of Intellectual Property
74 Seoul Journal of Business
Rights in Economic Growth,” Journal of Development Economics, 48,
323-350.
Greenwood, J. and M. Yorukoglu (1997), Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy 46, 49-95.
Helpman, E. (1993), “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property
Rights,” Econometrica, 61, 1247-80.
Kim, L. (1997), Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s
Technological Learning. Harvard Business School Press.
Korean Industrial Property Office (KIPO). (Various years), Intellectual
Property Statistics Annuals (in Korean). 
Korean Industrial Property Office (KIPO). (Various years), Annual Report. 
Kortum, S. and J. Lerner (1999), “What is Behind the Recent Surge in
Patenting?” Research Policy, 28, 1-22.
Mansfield, E. (1994), Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct
Investment, and Technology Transfer: Germany, Japan, and the
United States. International Finance Corporation, Discussion Paper 27.
Maskus, K. E. (2000a), International Property Rights in the Global
Economy. Institute for International Economics.
_________ (2000b), “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law,
32, 471-506.
_________ (2000c), “Lessons from Studying the International Economics of
Intellectual Property Rights,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 53, 2219-
2239.
Merges, R. P. (1992), Patent Law and Policy, Michie, Charlottesville.
OECD (2000), Science, Technology, and Industry Outlook.
Park, W. and J. C. Ginarte (1997), “Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Growth,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 51-61.
Romer, P. (1991), Increasing Returns and New Developments in the
Theory of Growth. in: Barnett, W., et al. (eds.), Equilibrium Theory
and Applications: Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium
in Economic Theory and Econometrics , 83-110, Cambridge
University Press. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper
and Row.
Sherwood, R. M. (1990), Intellectual Property and Economic Development.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Siebeck, W. E. (1990), Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature. World Bank
Discussion Papers 112 (The World Bank, Washington, DC), 33-46.
Song, J. (2002), “What is behind the Surge in Korean Patenting in the
United States?” A Background Report Submitted to the World
Bank.
Intellectual Property Regimes, Innovative Capabilities, and Patenting in Korea75

